Sustainable development blog : ecology and humanitarian aid

1.1 The Legal Conundrum: Same Faces, Different Roles

Rather than establishing a stable democracy, the imposition of new rules and of a temporary international government reinforced the weaknesses of the local community after the cease-fire. Civil responsibilities were dislocated from the locals to an abstract entity, the ‘foreigners’ and ‘their laws’. Moreover, UNMIK personnel, including native workers, were granted impunity. KFOR and UNMIK laws replicated the culture of impunity preserved from the Ottomans to Milosevic: whichever ethnic group was in power granted impunity to all its constituents.

These rules led to a reification of the humanitarian intervention. First, the Military-Technical Agreement between NATO and KLA leaders in Kumanovo did not replace an image of the previous ‘ancient enemy’ with one of a legitimate interlocutor that could further peace-building projects (Duclos, 2003: 145). Similar provisions that ignored the construction of ethnic hatreds could be found in the KFOR-UCK[1] Agreement of 20 June 1999. The treaty (www.nato.int/kosovo) asked for the demilitarization of the KLA and their reintegration into civil society.

However, the establishment of the new Kosovo Protection Force (KPC) enabled the disbanded KLA to retrieve its function as ‘guarantor’ of security for the Albanians. Although the KLA disposed of over “10,000 weapons, 5.5 million rounds of ammunition and 27,000 grenades” and gave up their uniforms, they transferred to the KPC and maintained a large proportion of their weapons (Judah 2000a: 299). UNMIK was the result of an agreement among NATO, Russia, and FRY, without the participation of Kosovars (Pula in Bieber and Daskalovski 2003: 202-3).

This logic of exclusion transpired through the Constitution of UNMIK. The document used a terminology that reinforced divides along ethnic lines: it emphasized the necessity to protect ‘communities’ rather than ‘minority groups.’ Only slight allusions were made to minority rights, through the double reference to the The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and The Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (www.unmikonline.org).

In practice, such language translates into a type of Gesellshaft in which each distinct group leads a distinct way of life, without interacting with anyone outside his community: outsiders are simply conceived as ‘non-members.’

Only one example of the repercussions of the Constitution would suffice to prove this point. The immunity granted to all UNMIK staff, including locals (Brand 2001: 478-9), contaminated the already corrupted judiciary, as immunities were lifted through abuses of power (Brand 2001: 479). The pre-war scenario was repeated again, as one ethnic group deemed all members of the antagonistic group guilty solely on ethnic basis.

1.2 The UNMIK Administration: A Reification of National Identities

In addition to reifying the people, the UNMIK administration also reified the ruling process. Although the United Nations was granted territorial administration and consequently became the government of the region[2], the Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1244 did not explicitly state that all powers were transferred to UNMIK for the exercise state sovereignty (Wilde, 2000-2003: 241, 243).

Because UN agents feared further reprisals by setting a precedent, the UNMIK Constitution did not make any allusions to the future independence of Kosovo. Thus, the Serbian government regarded the SCR 1422 as satisfactory and interpreted it as a reassurance that Kosovo would remain in their hands (Duclos, 2003: 151). The document, nevertheless, could be dismissed as ‘political science fiction’ (Ignatieff 2003: 68-9): Kosovars were called to enjoy ‘substantial autonomy and self-government’ (www.unmikonline.org) under Yugoslav sovereignty. Analogous to the UNMIK Constitution, the resolution omitted provisions for the protection of minority rights, the fundament of multiethnic ruling.

A contradiction of terms, the act eluded the fact that while Kosovar Albanians would not accept a centralized rule of Kosovo, the Serb minority would reject Kosovar majority rule (Ignatieff 2003: 68-9). The UN mandate could ultimately be construed as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Paradoxically, the role of the interim administration was to “evaluate conditions in Kosovo that the UN itself helped satisfy” (Kuci 2005: 348). Even after the peace negotiations, moderate political religious leaders who promoted interethnic dialogue were overshadowed by extremists. Instead, the UN installed a ‘dictatorship of virtue’ in which the un-elected representatives of international bodies undermined the elected representatives of the Kosovar population (Hayden in Brand 2001: 474).

Although the interim administration co-opted Rugova and Bukoshi (the former prime minister of Kosovo) in the Kosovo Transitional Government, they only had advisory status and did not participate in the decision-making process. Two other moderates, Trajkovic and Bishop Artemije, joined the organization as Serbian representatives. Dissatisfied with their consultant positions, the two Serbs left the organization in September 1999. (Judah 2000a: 299) The population was more receptive to these changes than the political representatives. Kosovar Albanians envisioned ‘the West’ as their ally in fighting against Serbian oppression.

They accepted UNMIK as a friendly force in their territory (Pula in Bieber and Daskalovski 2003: 206). Unfortunately for them, the international community in Kosovo had no coherent Balkans policy (Mertus 2001: 144). Although the NATO intervention in Kosovo reinforced alliance cohesion thanks to the major financial contribution of the U.S. (Chalmers 2001: 569-70), it did not ameliorate the situation of the Albanian population. UNMIK failed to promote access to international organizations for Kosovo citizens (Brand 2001: 487). For instance, it failed to set up offices in Mitrovica, Prizren, and Peja (Blumi in Bieber and Daskalovski 2003: 221), areas in which the level of political violence had been alarming during the war. UNMIK’s rhetoric used an apolitical, dichotomous taxonomy to classify local actors. ‘Victims’ were set against ‘perpetrators.’

Among the former some qualified as ‘deserving’ while others were shunned as ‘undeserving victims’ (di Lellio and Schwandner-Sievers 2006: 527). By disempowering the local community, UNMIK reinforced the very weaknesses on which Milosevic’s system of domination was built. Like NATO during the negotiations with the KLA, UNMIK failed to comprehend that not the loss of territory in itself disheartened the Albanian population, but the loss of the territory integral to the imagined homeland.

1.3 Milosevic est mort, vive UNMIK!

In theory, the deployment of a multinational force can reinforce the legitimacy of military action in the eyes of the local population and it can stimulate democratic governance within the public space (de Courtivron 2003: 141-2). The NATO intervention had already been saluted by Albanians because the international forces managed to restore peace and security in the long run and to help displaced persons return to their homes (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000: 193).

Gjeraqina Tuhina[3], a war correspondent from the Institute for War and Peace Reporting in Pristina, confessed her gratitude to NATO for eliminating the Serbian military threat: “At least something of ‘theirs’ has been destroyed and people can finally see it” (quoted in Judah 2000b: 329). While the NATO intervention prevented genocide against the Albanian population, it “indirectly facilitated the expulsion of many Serbs from the province” (Khazanov 2005: 283).

Although initially Hoolbrooke, the former U.S. Ambassador at the UN, had focused on Serb compliance by ignoring the KLA (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000: 57), many Serbs failed to understand that the bombing campaign was a response to Serbian army initiatives in Dubrovnik, Vukovar, Sarajevo, and Srebrenica. Instead, they perceived NATO’s tactic either as an attack on Serbians or as a form of revenging the minorities who had in their turn been the victims of the Serbs (Judah 2000b: 330). To maintain international peace and security in Kosovo, NATO employed KFOR.

The Kosovo Force was organized in five multinational brigades (MNBs): MNB North (led by France), MNB South (Germany), MNB West (Italy), MNB Central (United Kingdom), and MNB East (United States). Although not part of KFOR, Russian forces were also involved in certain areas (Nardulli et al 2002: 101, 103). The presence of international forces composed of 38 nations in this intra-State conflict initially reminded locals that consensus between various parties with different cultures could be established as long as people were willing to relinquish some of their interests in favour of peaceful cohabitation (de Courtivron 2003: 141-3). But the feelings of contentment were swiftly dispelled. Even after the UN and KFOR settled in Kosovo, genocidal acts remained common practice. This time, it was the Albanians who perpetrated mass atrocities against Serbs, Romas, Turks, and other minorities: the casualties amounted to several thousand deaths, 1,500 disappearances by mid-2001 and hundreds of thousands of cases of expulsion (Woodward 2001: 342). The abuses to which the Romas and the Serbs were subjected proved that the Albanians—encouraged by a considerable majority of the ethnic population—had tried to expel these minorities from Kosovo (Ignatieff 2003: 62-3).

The leading Albanian conspirators found new accomplices within the KPC, an institution that metamorphosed the former KLA into a legal security force. (Dérens 2001: 608) Inadvertently, by protecting the Albanians, KFOR discriminated against the Serbs[4] by treating possible perpetrators of atrocities and innocent people equally (O’Neill 2002: 16). In enforcing disarmament, KFOR could not distinguish KLA members from Albanian civilians. Russian and French troops harassed Albanians—the vast majority of the population. This action spoiled the opportunity to empower Kosovars. During the first three months of administration, UNMIK publicly condemned any brutality against Serbs as ‘revenge’ attacks of ‘barbaric and inhuman nature’ perpetuated by Albanians (Blumi in Bieber and Daskalovski 2003: 228). In turn, the Albanians suspected that KFOR was pro-Serb when the French forces decided to isolate the Serbs in an enclave in northern Kosovo, from Mitrovica to the Serbian border (O’Neill 2002: 45).

While the segregation reduced interethnic violence (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000: 177), it also decreased the possibilities of interethnic communication. When Albanian IDPs tried to return to their homes, they were faced with a legal deadlock. Although the UN Housing and Property Directorate had ‘sealed’ some of the houses officially redistributed to their owners, some properties had been damaged or burned after the 2004 riots (Smit 2006: 76). Kaldor wrongly ascribes these unsuccessful actions to the lack of efficient public security immediately after the cease-fire (Kaldor 2007: 175).

In fact, thanks to their strong teamwork, KFOR managed to control the affected areas and to decrease the level of violence (Clark 2001: 406). UNMIK employed the “largest authorized CIVPOL force ever”—consisting of 4,800 forces—in Kosovo. As policing authorities, they could arrest and detain criminals and suspects (O’Neill 2002: 37-40, 45). For instance, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) started recruiting more women (18% of the personnel) (O’Neill 2002: 112, 119), while trying to employ a representative demographic proportion of each minority in Kosovo (OSCE 2005: 3).

In addition, CIVPOL and KPS officers paid regular visits to local schools and offered classes on traffic safety, drug and alcohol abuse, and other human rights issues (O’Neill 2002: 133). The internationals failed to stop political revenge attacks not because KFOR had a weak security system, but because UNMIK leaders failed to understand the ideology through which ethnic hatreds had been constructed. The fact that Albanians and Serbs spoke different languages and did not intermingle also caused difficulties in terms of political unification (Nardulli et al 2002: 110).

Although they recruited and trained local personnel, the United Nations per se maintained a different spatial identity from the ‘local’ identity (Wilde 2000-3: 585). UNMIK human rights discourse often lacked both pragmatism and coherence: after all, the main response to the abuses faced by minorities, including the Kosovo Serbs, had been a plan of segregation (Brand 2001: 465-6). Antagonistic to “liberal views of progress and modernity” (Duffield 2001: 216), divisions based on ethnic categories were simultaneously shunned in theory and applied in practice. While they designed a smooth return to ‘normalcy’ for Kosovo, KFOR and UNMIK leaders overlooked the fact that the Albanian community was not given a chance to ‘rebuild on its own terms.’

The Albanians themselves did not subscribe to the idea of ‘security’ or ‘normalcy’, as the vast majority of the population had been living in a state of anomy for several decades (Blumi in Bieber and Daskalovski 2003: 229) With the exception of the riots of March 2004[5], UNMIK and KFOR were able to stop revolts during the following years.

The organizations reached their main long-term objectives regarding security plans, as well as emergence, administrative and economic reconstruction. Moreover, the Kosovar population had accepted these institutions, even if the local media sometimes sanctioned the internationals’ lack of interest in the fight against corruption and delinquency (de Courtivron 2003: 138-40). On the other hand, the method of financial redistribution turned out to be politically addictive (Ohmae 1996: 124): it suppressed the local population’s initiative to build an independent industry for future investment. Internationals were also accepted because they themselves did not abuse power and provided substantial funds and job opportunities for the bereaved population (de Courtivron 2003: 138-40).

At a societal level, the access to foreign-paid jobs widened the generation gap. For instance, men and the elderly who did not speak English resented the fact that UNMIK attributed new family and political roles for women in Kosovo (Mertus 2000: 35).

[1] UCK is another abbreviation used for the KLA. [2] Although some authors argue that the Security Council Resolution 1244 does not explicitly transfer state sovereignty to UNMIK (Brand 2001: 463) [3] To ensure the safety of the war correspondent, her articles had been labeled as anonymous until she escaped from Pristina. (www.motherjones.com). [4] For a similar point of view, see Blagojevic in Bieber and Daskalovski 2003: 177. [5] The riots of March 2004 constituted a rupture with the relatively tranquil period of the international interim administration. The upsurge was fuelled by the kidnapping of two Albanian children, drowned into the Ibar River by some Serbs and their dogs. The rioters who turned against the Serbs killed 19 people, injured 954, and led to 4,100 forced displacements. Furthermore, 550 houses and 27 Orthodox churches and monasteries were burned (Weller 2008: 660-1).